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"One can think offew subject areas more personal and more likely
to implicate privacy interests than that of one's health .. .
I. INTRODUCTION
To ensure a safe school environment, public schools in the United States search
students in many ways. Urine samples, locker searches, and even strip searches for
such things as drugs or weapons are types of searches of which students may be
subjected. But when is such a school search unconstitutional?
Imagine, as a female high school student being repeatedly asked by your male
swim coach if you are pregnant and ultimately being forced to take a pregnancy test
in the school locker room. This is what happened to seventeen-year old Leah
Gruenke.2
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found this particular search was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
1. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998); Doe v. City of New
York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994).
2. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 296 (3rd Cir. 2000).
3. Id. at 302. See infra Part III (providing a case analysis of Gruenke).
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However, the court stated in dicta that if a school official had a legitimate safety
concern for the health of the student, or an unborn child, then the school could
compel the student to take a pregnancy test.4 If the situation described by the Third
Circuit arose, would the search in fact be within the rubric of Fourth Amendment
protections? The compelling issue raised by the court's dicta is the extent a student's
privacy rights may be sacrificed in the school's interest in safety.
In the context of school searches, the continued judicial challenge remains
balancing the interests of a student's constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches with a school's interest in maintaining a safe environment.
Part II of this Casenote explains the existing law regarding searches in public
schools. Part III summarizes the facts and the Third Circuit's analysis in Gruenke
v. Seip5. Part IV critiques Gruenke and discusses whether compelling a student to
take a pregnancy test, when certain factors are present, would be constitutional
under the test set out in the United States Supreme Court's "special needs" cases.
Part V analyzes the policy ramifications of diminished Fourth Amendment
protections. Finally, this Casenote reaches the conclusion that the Gruenke court
incorrectly stated administering a pregnancy test to a student is justified if the school
had a legitimate safety concern.
II. THE BASIC TENETS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENTS
School rules are designed to keep students safe and maintain an environment
conducive to learning.6 For example, drug use and possession of weapons pose a
significant threat to the educational process by disrupting the ability of teachers to
teach and students to learn.7 One way to attain a safe school environment is to
confiscate drugs and weapons found pursuant to student searches.8 The United
States Supreme Court addressed those issues in New Jersey v. TL. 0. 9 and Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton.'o
4. 225 F.3d at 301.
5. See supra note 2.
6. See James M. McCray, Note, Urine Trouble! Extending Constitutionality to Mandatory Suspicionless
Drug Testing of Students in Extracurricular Activities, 53 VAND. L. REV. 387, 389 (2000).
7. Id.
8. See id. at 389-90 (finding schools have a compelling need to seek solutions to deter and combat problems
such as drug use); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,352-53 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stressing
that schools must take immediate action such as searching a student to ensure safety among those at the school).
9. See supra note 8.
10. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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A. New Jersey v. T.L.O."
1. The Facts
In TL.O., the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a school
official's search of a student's purse was reasonable. 12 TL.O. is the textbook
example of a school search of a student: a teacher at a high school discovered two
girls smoking in a restroom, in violation of school rules. 13 The students were taken
to the assistant vice principal's office because smoking was a violation of school
rules. 14 One of the students, T.L.O., denied smoking.' 5 The assistant vice principal
demanded to see T.L.O.'s purse, which he then opened and searched the student's
purse.16 He found a pack of cigarettes, removed them and, while doing so, noticed
rolling papers.' 7 Associating rolling papers with drug use, the assistant vice principal
continued searching T.L.O.'s purse and discovered marijuana and drug
paraphanelia. 18 The State brought delinquency charges against T.L.O., who sought
to suppress the evidence of marijuana and drug paraphanelia based on her claim that
the search was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.' 9
2. The Analysis
The rights of public school students with respect to the Fourth Amendment was
a case of first impression for the Supreme Court.20 The Fourth Amendment provides
the government shall not violate "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. ... ,2 The Fourth Amendment places limits on state governmental action
through "incorporation" by the Fourteenth Amendment.22 The purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect citizens from arbitrary governmental intrusions by
11. Supra note 8.
12. 469 U.S. at 336.
13. Id. at 328.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 329.
20. Id. at 333; Roseann Kitson, Note, High School Students, You're in Trouble: How the Seventh Circuit
Has Expanded the Scope of Permissible Suspicionless Searches in Public Schools, 1999 WIS. L. REv. 851, 856
(1999).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
22. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995). The Fourth Amendment expressly applies
to the federal government, whereas, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states. The Supreme Court has held
that the "Fourteenth Amendment extends this [the Fourth Amendment] constitutional guarantee to searches and
seizures by state officers." Id.
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requiring all searches and seizures be reasonable. 23 "[W]hat is reasonable depends
,,24on the context within which a search takes place.
a. School Officials
TL.O. established that "the Federal Constitution ... prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures by state officers. 25 Public school officials are agents of the
government and subject to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 26 Therefore, if a public school official searches
a student or a student's possessions, the search must be reasonable.27
b. Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements
Typically, "reasonableness" has been interpreted to require consent or a search
warrant.28 In issuing a search warrant, a magistrate determines if sufficient probable
cause exists. The magistrate must be neutral to "serve as a check against the
potential for officials to arbitrarily invade an individual's security and privacy
interests. '29 The warrant requirement thus limits the possibility of an abuse of
discretion by an official.30
Although the Court has often interpreted the term "reasonableness" to require
probable cause and a warrant, in limited circumstances, neither is required. 3' The
Supreme Court in T.L. 0. ruled the warrant requirement for searching a student is
unsuitable for a school because the warrant requirement interferes with a school's
need for swift and informal disciplinary procedures. 32 The Court reasoned a school
must take immediate action to maintain an environment conducive to learning and
to protect students and staff, which it cannot do if it must secure a warrant before
searching a student for drugs or weapons.33 Therefore, TL.O. establishes that public
school officials do not need to obtain a warrant before searching a student.34
23. TLO., 469 U.S. at 335.
24. Id. at 337.
25. Id. at 334.
26. Id. at 336.
27. Id. at 341.
28. Id. at 340.
29. Andrew P. Massmann, Note, Drug Testing High School and Junior High School Students After Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton: Proposed Guidelines for School Districts, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 721, 733-34 (1997).
30. Id.
31. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (asserting that the exception to the probable cause
requirement and use of the balancing test is limited to when there is a special law enforcement need for greater
flexibility).
32. Id. at 340.
33. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 340.
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Ordinarily, a search warrant must be based on probable cause.35 However,
teachers are not trained or experienced in identifying probable cause, therefore, are
ill-equipped to make such judgments.36 For this reason, a school official does not
need to strictly adhere to the traditional requirement that searches be based on
probable cause.37 Thus, the TL.O. Court carved out an exception to the traditional
Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement, which is known as the "special
needs" exception.38
c. The Special Needs Exception
In TL.O., Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, described the special
needs exception as "Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause
requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests
for that of the Framers." 39 In place of adhering to the Fourth Amendment's textual
requirements, the "special needs" exception allows a court to balance the level of
intrusion on an individual against the governmental interests.40 The public school
setting presents just such a "special need" circumstance, which justifies the use of
a balancing test in place of probable cause.41
In some circumstances, the use of the "special needs" exception requires a level
of individualized suspicion. 42 For example, if reasonable grounds exist to believe
that a particular student possesses evidence of illegal activity, or has violated a
school rule, a school official may have individual suspicion on which a search of
that student can be based. 43 Additionally, even when the "special needs" exception
applies, a search must still be reasonable. 44 Yet, as a result of TL.O., "lower
standards" will apply in determining if a search is reasonable due to the unique
35. Id.
36. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (describing how making a probable cause determination would take
time away from teaching and helping students).
37. Id. at 341.
38. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
39. Id.
40. Massmann, supra note 29, at 741; Leslie G. Peters, Note, Message in a Bottle: Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 861, 873 (1996). This special needs rule was later adopted by the Court and a
balance test was created which measures 1) the level of governmental intrusion, 2) the individuals expectations of
privacy, and 3) the government's legitimate interest in performing the search. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v.
Van Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989).
41. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also, 469 U.S. at 348. (Powell, J., concurring)
(explaining it was unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections as adults. He found that the
school's substantial interest in maintaining order and discipline outweighed the student's privacy interest.).
42. Id. at 341-42. But see Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653-54 (stating the Fourth Amendment does not require such
individualized suspicion found in TL.O. In some "special needs" cases the Court does not require any
individualized suspicion.).
43. TL.O.,469 U.S. at330-31.
44. Id. at 337.
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school setting. 45 "The legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. 4 6
Under TL.O., a two-prong test is applied to determine if the search is
reasonable.47 First, the interference must be justified at its inception by some
suspicion of wrongdoing.48 Second, the scope of the search must be reasonably
related to the justification given for the interference.4 9 Absent this finding of
individualized suspicion, searches are generally considered unreasonable. °
d. Application of the Two-Prong Reasonableness Test
The TL. 0. Court created an exception to the requirement of probable cause by
establishing a two-pronged test to determine whether a search in a public school
based on individualized suspicion was reasonable. 51 Although the search in TL.O.
was not based on probable cause, it was based upon individualized suspicion that
a student had violated a school rule.52 The assistant vice principal had reason to
believe T.L.O. possessed cigarettes in her purse because a teacher had discovered
her smoking and, therefore, the search was justified at its inception.53 The assistant
vice principal searched the student's purse for cigarettes, which eventually led to the
discovery of marijuana.54 Once the assistant vice principal discovered evidence of
marijuana, he was justified in searching the purse further.55 These measures were
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive.56
Thus, the search satisfied the two-pronged test and was found reasonable.
e. Conclusion
Due to the unique nature of the school environment, a school official does not
need probable cause or a warrant to search a student.5 8 In a school setting, rather
than applying a strict Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court balances the level of
the intrusion on an individual against the governmental interests to determine if the
45. Id. at 340.
46. Id. at 341.
47. Id. at 340-41.
48. Id. at 341.
49. Id.
50. Jennifer L. Barnes, Commentaries on Mark Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts:
Comment: Students Under Seige? Constitutional Considerations for Public Schools Concerned with School Safety,
34 U. RICH. L. REv. 621, 637 (2000).
51. 469 U.S. at 342.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 341-42.
54. Id. at 342.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 341, 347-48.
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search was reasonable. 59 The decision in TL.O. left the question of whether
individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard in
school searches unanswered. 60 This question was implicitly addressed in Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton.
B. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
61
In Vernonia, the Supreme Court upheld a school policy of random searches.
Unlike the individualized-based search in TL.O., these searches were not based
upon individualized suspicion, yet they were still considered reasonable.6" The Court
stated, "'the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such
[individualized] suspicion."' 63 Accordingly, the Court answered the question left
open in TL.O. by finding that individualized suspicion is not an essential element
of the reasonableness standard in school searches.64
1. The Facts
Student athletes were the leaders of the drug culture in Vernonia schools.65 The
school board implemented a drug testing policy to prevent drug use and to protect
student health and safety by randomly testing student athletes for drug use.66 James
Acton was denied eligibility to play football because he refused to sign the random
drug testing consent form.67
2. The Analysis
First, the Court held the "special needs" exception articulated in TL. 0. applied
to this public school setting.68 A public school setting constitutes a "special needs"
situation where the probable cause and warrant requirements should be set aside,
because they would "unduly interfere" with school discipline and regular activities.69
Thereafter, the Court determined the reasonableness of the search by looking at the
nature of the privacy interest, the character of the intrusion, and the governmental
interest.
70
59. Id. at 341-42.
60. Id. at 342 n.8.
61. 515 U.S. at 646.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 653 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 649.
66. Id. at 650.
67. Id. at 651.
68. Id. at 653.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 654-65; see also Kitson, supra note 20, at 859-60.
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a. Nature of the Privacy Interest
"Although acknowledging that students still do not 'shed their constitutional
rights... at the schoolhouse gate' the Court reasoned that students' rights must
yield to the school's interest in ensuring a conductive learning environment."'" In
TL.O., the Court held that "students within the school environment have a lesser
expectation of privacy than members of the population generally., 72 In Vernonia,
the Court said student athletes have an even lesser legitimate expectation of privacy
than other students. 73 The Court reasoned student athletes regularly "suit up" and
take showers in front of each other, and further, public locker rooms are not known
for their privacy.74 Moreover, the Court noted student athletes have a reduced
expectation of privacy because they voluntarily subject themselves to a higher
degree of regulation than other students by merely "choosing to try out for the
team., 75 The Court reasoned, "somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a
'closely regulated industry,' students who voluntarily participate in school athletics
have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including
privacy. ' ' 16 Thus, the Court concluded the privacy interests of student athletes were
minimal.77
b. Level of the Intrusion
In weighing the level of intrusion upon student athletes, the Court first
recognized a urinalysis, by its very nature, has been held to intrude upon a person's
privacy. 78 The Vernonia Court then divided the intrusion analysis into two parts: the
manner of the intrusion and the information gained from the intrusion.79 The
Vernonia Court considered the manner in which the urine sample was taken and
found it was conducted in as private a setting as possible. 80 The Court considered the
information the test disclosed, and said, "it is significant that the test at issue here
looks only for drugs, and not for whether the student is, for example, epileptic,
pregnant, or diabetic.' Moreover, the intrusions were minimized because the test
results were only disclosed to school officials who had an interest in cultivating a
71. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655-56 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. County School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)); see also McCray, supra note 6, at 407.
72. 469 U.S. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
73. 515 U.S. at 657.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 658.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 657; Joseph S. Dressner, Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Random Urinalysis Drug Testing Upheld
in Vermonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Action, 4 SPORTS LAwJ. 115, 126 (1997).
81. Id.
2001 / Testing Students for Pregnancy: What's Next?
safer environment for students; they were not the basis of a disciplinary action. 82The
Court concluded these invasions of privacy were not significant based on the
minimal privacy interest at stake and the limited intrusion involved.83
c. Governmental Interests
The next focus of the balancing test is to determine whether sufficient
governmental interest exists to justify the search at issue.84 The Court considered
"the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here and the
efficacy of this means for meeting it."'85 The governmental interest was deterrence
of drug use by student athletes because drugs have dangerous effects on school
children and cause disruption of the educational process. 86 The Court noted "This
program is directed more narrowly to drug use by school athletes, where the risk of
immediate physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport
is particularly high. 87 According to the Court, the best way to solve the problem is
to ensure athletes do not use drugs.88 The school board's program attempted to do
just that.89 This drug-testing policy was a reasonable way to deal with a serious
threat to the educational environment. 90
The Court found the school's interest outweighed the student athlete's reduced
expectation of privacy. 9' Therefore, the Vernonia drug-testing policy was held
reasonable and constitutional.92
III. GRUENKE V. SEIP
A. The Facts
Leah Gruenke, a junior at Emmaus High School, was on the varsity swim
team.93 Michael Seip, the varsity swim coach, suspected Gruenke was pregnant.94
Seip noticed Gruenke was nauseated at practices, made several trips to the restroom
82. Id.; Peters, supra note 40, at 869.
83. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660.
84. Id, at 661.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 662.
88. Id. at 663.
89. Id.
90. Massmann, supra note 29, at 762 (referring to School v. Tipercanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309,
1321 (7th Cir. 1988).
91. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
92. Id.
93. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 295.
94. Id.
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in a short period of time, and had a reduced energy level.95 Seip asked his assistant
coach, Kim Kryzan, to discuss the issue of pregnancy with Gruenke.96 Later, both
Kryzan and Seip approached Gruenke to discuss sex and pregnancy. Gruenke denied
being pregnant.
97
Fellow team members also suspected Gruenke was pregnant.98 Gruenke denied
the possibility of being pregnant and claimed it was "nobody's business." 99 Also, at
the coach's request, a school guidance counselor and a school nurse questioned
Gruenke about being pregnant.'00 Again, Gruenke refused to give any information
and denied the possibility of being pregnant.1"'
Several mothers of other team members also suspected Gruenke was pregnant
and suggested Seip have Gruenke take a pregnancy test.102 Then, Lynn Williams, the
mother of a team member, bought a pregnancy test and gave it to Seip who
reimbursed her for it. 1
03
Later, Abby Hochella and Kathy Ritter, fellow team members, suggested to
Gruenke she take a pregnancy test.'°4 Gruenke refused.'0 5 Gruenke claimed Hochella
and Ritter approached her the next day and told her Seip had a pregnancy test he
wanted her to take. 0 6 Hochella and Ritter claimed they only told Gruenke that Seip
had a pregnancy test for her if she wanted to take it.'07 However, Gruenke claimed
Hochella and Ritter approached her again that same day and told her if she did not
take the pregnancy test Seip would take her off the relay team.0 8 At this point,
Gruenke agreed to take the test.' 9 Gruenke took the test in the girls locker room
while Ritter, Hochella, and Sara Cierski, another team member, were all present. "0
The test was positive-Gruenke was pregnant."'
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. Gruenke alleged the pregnancy test was administered by or on behalf of Seip; Seip's act, as a school
official, of reimbursing a mother for the pregnancy test, constituted state action. Id.
104. Id. at 296.
105. See id. (establishing that Gruenke said she would not take the pregnancy test unless everyone else on
the swim team took one as well).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. Gruenke alleged she was forced to take the pregnancy test by Seip. Although she eventually agreed
to take the test, she alleged she felt she had to take the test or she would be off the swim team and therefore, she did
not consent to this search. The court agreed and noted, "a school official's administration of a pregnancy test to a
student 'clearly constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."' Id.
110. Id.
11. Id. at 297.
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Seip denied encouraging Gruenke to take the test or encouraging the other team
members to persuade her.1"2 Seip admitted telling Hochella and Ritter, "if [Gruenke]
were his friend, he would ask her to take a pregnancy test."... 3 After learing
Gruenke was pregnant, Seip asked the assistant swim coach, an orthopedist, if in his
medical opinion, Gruenke could still compete during the relays. The assistant coach
said swimming would not endanger Gruenke."1
4
B. The Analysis
Gruenke sued Seip under the Civil Rights Act of 1979,"15 claiming the
pregnancy test was an illegal search in violation of her Fourth Amendment right." 6
The constitutionality of a school official administering a pregnancy test to a student
was an issue of first impression in the District Court. 17 Although the District Court
found administering a pregnancy test constitutes a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Seip on the basis of
his qualified immunity defense. 18 A qualified immunity defense is successful when
an official can show he did not violate any "clearly established constitutional rights"
or the claim does not constitute a violation of a constitutional right. 1'9 The District
Court reasoned Gruenke did not have a clearly established constitutional right to be
free from the search because administering a pregnancy test to a student was one of
"first impression."
120
The Third Circuit Court agreed with the District Court that administering a
pregnancy test is a "search" within the Fourth Amendment.' 2' The Third Circuit
Court, however, disagreed with the District Court's application of the qualified
immunity standard. 22 "Merely because the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on
whether a school official's administration of a pregnancy test to a student violates
her Fourth Amendment rights does not mean the right is not clearly established."'' 23
The court applied the Vernonia balancing test to decide if Seip clearly violated
Gruenke' s Fourth Amendment right. 2 4 Before applying the Vernonia balancing test,
the court recognized the "special needs" exception applied to the public school
112. Id. at 296.
113. Id.
114. Id, at 297.
115. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983.
116. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 295.
117. Id. at 300.
118. Id. at 295.
119. Id. at 299.
120. Id, at 300.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (showing the court should have reviewed current Fourth Amendment law to see if Gruenke's right
was clearly established).
124. Id. at 301.
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setting."'2 Reasonableness, according to the court, is determined by "balancing the
government's interest against the individual's expectation of privacy."
' 126
Consistent with Vernonia, the Third Circuit found Gruenke, a student athlete,
had a lower expectation of privacy than fellow students who do not play sports
because student athletes regularly undress, shower in front of each other, and are
subject to more regulations. 127 Here, however, the intrusion was high because the
test would reveal personal information-whether or not Gruenke was pregnant.
128
Seip's lack of discretion and failure to stop the spread of gossip also made the
intrusion high. 129 "The intrusion of a pregnancy test that reveals personal
information may be mitigated if the test is conducted in private and disclosure of the
11130information garnered is limited, but the coach showed no such discretion ....
The Third Circuit Court ruled the governmental interest was low as Seip was
merely curious to see if Gruenke was pregnant.1 31 The court stated, "although
student athletes have a very limited expectation of privacy, a school cannot compel
a student to take a pregnancy test absent a legitimate health concern about a possible
pregnancy and the exercise of some discretion. 13 2 Seip did not have a legitimate
safety concern pertaining to Gruenke's pregnancy, evidenced by his failure to ask
a doctor about any safety hazard until after Gruenke took the pregnancy test.1 33 "An
official ... cannot require a student to submit to this intrusion merely to satisfy his
curiosity.' 134 Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded the governmental interest was
outweighed by the individual's expectation of privacy. 135 Hence, the school's
administration of a pregnancy test to the student athlete solely for reasons of
curiosity was a violation of her clearly established right to be free from an
unreasonable search. 136 Therefore, the Third Circuit rejected Seip's qualified
immunity defense, reversed the District Court's decision to grant summary
judgment, and remanded the case back to the District Court. 137
At the same time, however, the court suggested in other circumstances school
administration of a pregnancy test could constitute a reasonable and constitutional
search.138 "This is not to say that a student, athlete or not, cannot be required to take
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (adopting language of Vernonia).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 302.
130. Schools: Qualified Immunity Reversed for Coach who Made Swimmer Take Pregnancy Test, U.S. L.
WKLY. DAILY ED., Sept. 13, 2000, at d3 (mentioning the fact the coach did not discourage the spread of gossip
about Gruenke's status).
131. 225 F.3d at 301 (pointing out the coach lacked a legitimate health concern about Gruenke).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 302.
138. Id. at 301.
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a pregnancy test. There may be unusual instances where a school nurse or another
appropriate school official has legitimate concerns about the health of the student
or her unborn child."'
' 39
IV. CRITIQUE OF GRUENKE
Imagining circumstances when a school official would have a sufficient health
concern to justify compelling a student to take a pregnancy test is not easy. 40 As the
Third Circuit pointed out, testing high school athletes for pregnancy is not the
norm. 14' Forcing anyone to submit to a pregnancy test is a significant personal
intrusion. 142 This intrusion may be especially great for a high school student.
43
The Gruenke court followed the Vernonia standard and balanced the level of
intrusion on the student against the school's interest in order to determine whether
the search was reasonable.'" Although the Gruenke court found the search clearly
violated Gruenke's Fourth Amendment right, it may not have placed enough
emphasis on the student's privacy interests in being forced to take a pregnancy
test. 45 Rather than acknowledging sufficient weight to the privacy invasion, the
court merely focused on an insubstantial governmental interest. 146 The court's
misplaced focus led to its statement, in dicta, that this type of search may be justified
if a school official simply had a greater governmental interest. 47 If the court had
given Gruenke's privacy interest the heightened weight it deserves, then the court
could have instead asserted that the government must have a compelling interest for
this type of search.148 A test revealing pregnancy has a much higher level of
intrusion as compared to a drug test because pregnancy is a highly personal and
intimate matter.149 Due to a pregnancy test's higher level of intrusion a higher
139. Id. (contemplating the issue of when it would be constitutional for a school official to force a student
to take a pregnancy test, which remains an open issue).
140. But see infra Part IV.B.2.
141. See Schools: Qualified Immunity Reversed for Coach who Made Swimmer Take Pregnancy Test, supra
note 130, at d3.
142. See infra Part IV.A.3.b; see also, Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658 (asserting that one privacy aspect of
urinalyses is the information it is disclosing. "[lit is significant that the tests at issue here look only for drugs, and
not for whether the student is, for example, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.") (emphasis added). The Court
implicitly states a test disclosing pregnancy is more intrusive than a drug test because it is more intimate and
personal.
143. See infra Part IV.A.1.
144. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 301.
145. See Ascolese v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 902 F. Supp. 533, 550 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (pointing out
"employees have a very strong interest in maintaining the privacy of information related to their pregnancy." The
Ascolese court placed greater emphasis on the individual's privacy interest in pregnancy testing the court in
Gruenke.).
146. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 301.
147. See infra Part IV.A.3.b.
148. See infra Part IV.A.3.b.
149. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
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governmental interest must exist to justify the search. 50 The Gruenke court stated,
in dicta, that a school, in unusual circumstances, could have a legitimate health
concern for a student to justify administering a pregnancy test,' 51 but to some courts
this still may not constitute a reasonable search because of the privacy interest.
A. Privacy Interest Is Higher for Pregnancy than Drugs
The Gruenke court's analysis maintained students do not have the same
constitutional protections as adults. 52 Also, Gruenke adhered to the Vernonia
Court's conclusion that student athletes have an even further reduced expectation
of privacy compared to other students.'53 The Gruenke court's distinction between
student athletes and other students is based on reasoning from Vernonia. 154 Gruenke
considered the nature of the search without giving due weight, as noted in Vernonia,
to the differences between a test revealing drug use and one revealing pregnancy.
155
1. Students Versus Adults
The Court in TL.O. established students within the school setting have a lesser
expectation of privacy than members of society in general. 56 The Vernonia Court
reaffirmed this notion by mentioning an adult could not be tested for drugs in the
same manner as a student, as this would violate an adult's constitutional rights.
57
Does TL.O. and Vernonia stand for the proposition students should always be
afforded lower privacy rights than adults? As discussed below, the reasoning courts
have used to determine students have lesser expectations of privacy in searches,
particularly in administering a pregnancy test, is not entirely convincing.
An interesting case to compare with Gruenke is Ascolese v. Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority.'58 InAscolese, an adult female police officer
was forced to take a pregnancy test as part of her fitness test. 59 The Ascolese court
said that as a police officer, the employee's privacy interests were somewhat
150. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661 (describing the standard as requiring an important enough governmental
interest to justify the search at hand, meaning the greater the intrusion, the greater governmental interest needed).
151. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 301.
152. Id. (emphasizing the person searched in Gruenke is a student, rather than an adult).
153. Id.
154. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.
155. See Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 301 (stating the urinalysis is clearly intrusive, yet continuing to assert that the
student has a very limited expectation of privacy in regards to the pregnancy test). But see Vernonia, 515 U.S. at
658 (implying a significant difference between a drug test and a pregnancy test with regard to the level of intrusion).
156. 469 U.S. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
157. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657; see also, David Cole, Tough Times at Vernonia High the Supreme Court
Thinks it's 'Reasonable' to Require Suspicionless Drug Tests for 12-Year-Olds. The Trouble is, Who Knows What
Will Pass the Test Next?, 141 NEW JERSEY L.J, 2089 (1995) (pointing out that in Vernonia, Scalia seems to suggest
that just because schoolchildren can be tested does not mean adults can).
158. 902 F. Supp. 553 (1985).
159. Id. at 557.
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diminished because of intrusions normally associated with her profession-the same
reasoning used in Vernonia regarding the student athlete's privacy interests.'
60
Police officers, like student athletes, participate in communal undressing in locker
rooms and have to undergo physical exams as part of the job. Therefore, according
to the courts, they should expect less privacy.1
61
However, the court in Ascolese held Ascolese's expectation of privacy, as to the
pregnancy test results, was so significant it was not overcome by the governmental
interest. 162 "The privacy interests at stake are sufficiently strong ... .,,'63 Comparing
Ascolese to Gruenke, the implication is student athletes' expectations of privacy are
significantly diminished unlike adults' expectations under similar circumstances. In
both of these cases, similar factors tending to diminish privacy were present, such
as communal undressing in a locker room and being regularly subjected to physical
exams. Yet, the Gruenke court seems to have held the student had a lesser
expectation of privacy in an administration of a pregnancy test than the adult in
Ascolese. In Ascolese, the governmental interest was the female police officer's
health and safety.'64 Likewise in Gruenke, the proposed governmental interest is the
health of the student or unborn child. 165 In both cases, similar governmental interests
are used in an attempt to justify administering a pregnancy test. In Ascolese, the
governmental interest was not sufficient to declare the search reasonable.1
66
However, the Gruenke court purports the governmental interest could be sufficient
to justify administration of a pregnancy test upon a student.'67 The employee police
officer's expectations of privacy with regards to pregnancy were strong enough to
overcome the governmental interest, as should be a student athlete's.
According to TL. 0., students spend more time together, get to know each other,
and therefore, they have a reduced expectation of privacy. 68 However, some adults
in the workplace spend just as much time together throughout the day and get to
know each other well. Adults, like students, see each other outside of the school or
work setting. 169 Yet, the divergent court opinions imply adults expect greater privacy
than students.
The Court in TL.0. stated students do not lose their constitutional rights at the
schoolhouse gate. 7° However, by distinguishing students from adults on the basis
160. Id. at 550.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 225 F.3d at 301.
166. 902 F. Supp. at 550.
167. 225 F.3d at 301.
168. TL.O., 460 U.S. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
169. ld.
170. Id.
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that they spend time together and get to know each other at school, the students do
lose some constitutional protection by virtue of the fact they are students.
171
The Court in Vernonia stated students have a lesser expectation of privacy in
part because of their relationship with the state. 172 Students are placed in temporary
custody of the state as schoolmaster and this limits their expectation of privacy.
173
The Court attributes greater weight to a state's interest in the balancing test, while
simultaneously lending less legitimacy to a student's expectation of privacy.
Therefore, the Court's rationale clearly diminishes students' constitutional rights
based solely on the fact they are at school.
174
The courts' reasons for concluding a student has a reduced expectation of
privacy, and thus, less protection under the Fourth Amendment, are not persuasive.
The justification given by courts is a search is less intrusive when the individual
being searched has a reduced expectation of privacy. 175 However, a search may be
more intrusive to a student than an adult due to other factors courts do not seem to
consider, such as age: High school students are at a vulnerable age and a critical
stage in life.
Many high school students try to fit in with others and revealing personal
aspects of their life could be a greater intrusion on them than on adults. The courts
do not give enough weight to the impact the information, revealed by the search, has
on the already vulnerable student. 176 Students may put pressure on themselves to
maintain a certain reputation in order to gain acceptance from other students. If
being a pregnant teen is not socially acceptable, then a female student might want
to keep that information to herself.177 In contrast, pregnant adults may be more
socially acceptable and if so, revealing an adult's pregnancy status would be a lesser
intrusion. The courts' rationale is based on generalizations students expect less
privacy than adults because they spend time together and get to know each other
better.178 Even if students expect less privacy because they spend more time
together, revealing information personal to a student could result in a greater
intrusion than on an adult.
171. Cole, supra note 157.
172. 515 U.S. at 654.
173. George M. Dery III., The Coarsening of our National Manners: The Supreme Court's Failure to Protect
Privacy Interests ofSchoolchildren-Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 693, 706 (1995).
174. See id. at 714 (asserting the Vernonia Court took a departure from the Court's prior holdings regarding
student's privacy rights. In TL.O., the Court recognized a school official searching a student's purse was a severe
violation of her privacy expectations which was ultimately outweighed by the school's legitimate interest. The
TL.O. Court did not attempt to minimize the relevant privacy interest as the Court in Vernonia did. In fact, the Court
in TL 0. equated a student's right of privacy to that of an adult.).
175. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 674.
176. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648. Perhaps the Vernonia Court did not take the effect upon a student into
consideration because unlike a pregnancy test, a test revealing drug use would likely affect a student similarly to
an adult because the stigma is the same regardless of age.
177. See Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 296 (pointing out Gruenke stated it was "nobody's business" if she was
pregnant or not. This demonstrates Gruenke, perhaps like other students, wanted to keep her pregnancy private).
178. TL.O., 460 U.S. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Furthermore, what are the courts teaching students by giving them reduced
protections? Ultimately, the court conveys a disturbing message: students, especially
high school students, are beginning to formulate their views on authority,
government, and politics. Yet, if students receive the message that they have
reduced rights and are subject to greater intrusion than adults, their attitudes toward
the judicial system may not be favorable. 79 Some students may not have a favorable
view of the Constitution if it is being applied differently, and perhaps inadequately,
toward them. 80 Students may feel they are being treated as "citizens with a lesser
status."18' The message is students should not worry because as soon as they become
an adult in the eyes of the law they will have greater constitutional protections. 182 In
conclusion, there is no valid reason why a court should find a student has a lower
expectation of privacy than an adult when the search involves pregnancy.
2. Student Athletes Versus Other Students
a. Locker Room Reasoning
The Court in Vernonia said student athletes have an even further reduced
expectation of privacy than students who do not participate in sports. 183 "School
sports are not for the bashful."'' 84 Student athletes should expect fewer privacy
rights. 185 The Court's reasoning is simple: student athletes who frequently change
and shower in front of each other do not expect as much privacy.186 "Public school
locker rooms... are not notable for the privacy they afford."' 8 7 There may be some
logic to the Court's reasoning. Students athletes tend to form a closer bond to each
other due to the time spent with each other, team morale, and likely physical contact
associated with the sport. 88 This closeness may compromise their notion of
privacy.' 89 Therefore, concluding student athletes have a greater reduced expectation
of privacy than other students seems logical, at first glance.
179. Darrel Jackson, Note, The Constitution Expelled: What Remains ofStudents' Fourth Amendment Rights?
28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 673, 695 (1996) (quoting James Acton's father from Vernonia who said suspicionless drug testing
sends students the wrong message they are guilty until proven innocent and even second-class citizens).
180. Id. at 695-96.
181. Id.; see id. (noting students may begin to wonder when the "exceptions end and the guarantee of liberty
begins").
182. Id. Unless, of course, the student is an adult.
183. 515 U.S. at 657.
184. Id.
185. See Christian Edward Samay, Judicial Activism Works the Constitution Out of Shape-Acton and its
Atrophic Effect on the Fourth Amendment Rights of Student Athletes, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 291, 304 (1997)
(criticizing the Court by stating that the mere fact children share a locker room is not sufficient grounds to force
them to urinate on command and divulge personal information to school officials).
186. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.
187. Id.
188. See id. (noting students who voluntarily participate in school sports should expect intrusions).
189. Id.
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Although student athletes participate in privacy-diminishing locker room
activities, so do other nonstudent athletes.1 90 Many high schools require students to
take physical education classes. Regular physical education, aerobics, and weight
training classes also require students to change in front of one another in a locker
room.' 9' "The fact that athletes take communal showers and change in the locker
rooms is, of course, true of every student who takes gym class."' 192 So, students who
do not participate in the school's organized sports program, but are enrolled in a
required physical education class, may also have a reduced expectation of privacy.
For this reason, the Vernonia Court's distinction between student athletes and other
students on the basis of locker room activities is not persuasive. Thus, that the
Court's rationale further diminishes a "student athlete's" expectation of privacy
seems ill-considered.
b. Closely Regulated Industry Rationale Fails the Nonathlete-Student
Distinction
The Court has established those who are involved in a closely regulated industry
have a reduced expectation of privacy.' 93 The Court reasoned those in such an
industry expect and understand their business will be subject to inspection and
therefore expect less privacy. 194 The Court in Vernonia used this theory of "closely
regulated industry" as another basis to find student athletes have a lesser expectation
of privacy.' 95
According to the Court, student athletes have a reduced expectation of privacy
because they are in a similar situation to that of a closely regulated industry. 96
"Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a 'closely regulated industry,'
students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect
intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy."' 197 The Court
rationalized student athletes are subject to many different sporting regulations'9" and
have to undergo a physical examination to participate in sports.
199
The Court's comparison of students to adults in closely regulated industries
seems valid. However, the distinction between student athletes and nonstudent
190. Cole, supra note 157.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987).
194. Id.
195. 515 U.S. at 657.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id. (noting schools require student athletes to carry "adequate insurance coverage or sign an
insurance waiver, maintain a minimum grade point average, and comply with 'any rules of conduct, dress, training
hours and related matters as may be established for each sport by the head coach and athletic director with the
principal's approval').
199. Id.
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athlete is much less persuasive. While athletes are subject to rules, regulations, and
physical examinations, so too are nonathletes.2° Many students may have to
undergo some physical exams such as hearing and spinal tests. All students are
expected to abide by many school rules. The Court's only basis for distinguishing
between student athletes and nonathletes seems to be student athletes voluntarily
agree to be subject to more physical exams, rules, and regulations than other
students. 20' Hence, the Court's argument that student athletes are "closely
regulated," but other students are not is weak.
3. The Nature of the Search
a. Physical Examination Reasoning
Another reason given for students' reduced expectation of privacy in drug or
pregnancy tests is students are subject to various physical examinations and
vaccinations for various diseases.20 2 Typical examinations students may have to take,
are vision, dental, back, and dermatologist checkups. 23 This reasoning was used by
the Vernonia Court to support the idea students have a diminished expectation of
privacy in a urinalysis test.2"
Even though students are subject to various examinations for health reasons,
being subject to a urinalysis may still be quite intrusive. The typical exams given to
students are much less intrusive than testing a student's urine for drugs or
pregnancy. Testing one's eyes, teeth, skin, or spines does not create the same
negative stigma as testing for drugs or pregnancy.205 Medical examinations for skin
or spine are more intrusive, as they require students to remove their clothing.
However, skin or spinal examinations lack a social taboo.20 6 Moreover, the typical
examination students are subjected to will merely produce biological information
and, at most, reflect students biological defects.2 7 Overall, the typical examinations
students are subjected to are not as intrusive as a pregnancy test.
Unlike the results of a drug or pregnancy test, dental, vision and dermatological
examinations do not reflect a student's poor judgment and society's disapproval. 20 8
Moreover, the ramifications of these different types of examinations vary
200. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 (pointing out all students, for their own welfare, are routinely required
to submit to various physical examinations, and vaccination against various diseases).
201. Id. at 657 (reasoning that because student athletes voluntarily subject themselves to a higher degree of
regulation, they expect less privacy).
202. Id. at 656.
203. Id.
204. Jackson, supra note 179, at 684; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656-57.
205. See Dery, supra note 173, at 716 (stating "[e]xams for vision, hearing, and dental health involve no
disrobing. Further, there is no societal taboo against seeing, hearing, or chewing in the company of others.").
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. ld.
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considerably. For instance, the typical medical examinations will result in a lecture
to take better care of oneself.2°9 A positive drug test on the other hand, could, in
some schools, result in suspension from school activities. 20 Also, a positive
pregnancy test could likely result in adverse treatment from teachers, students, and
society in general. 211 Therefore, despite the Court's conclusions, the fact students are
subject to some physical exams does not translate logically to a lowered expectation
of privacy in a urinalysis for drugs or pregnancy.
b. Drug Tests Versus Pregnancy Tests
One significant factor considered in determining the level of intrusion is the
nature of the information revealed from the search.212 Although there are similarities
between drug testing and pregnancy testing, some notable differences may "tip the
scale" causing pregnancy testing to have more intrusive consequences. Taking a
drug test is similar to taking a pregnancy test. In both instances a person's urine is
used to gather information. "There are few activities in our society more personal
or private than the passing of urine., 213 The Court has even recognized that this type
of testing intrudes upon "an excretory function traditionally shielded by great
privacy.''214 Even though the manner of the search is private, the Court in Vernonia
found the invasion of drug testing insignificant because it solely acts to detect drugs
in a student's system.215 Noting the similarity of the two tests, it would seem logical
that the level of intrusion of the two tests is likewise similar. However, there is more
to consider when determining the level of intrusion than just the method of the
exam.
The degree of intrusion depends on the type of information the test discloses.2 6
A school is intruding into a very personal area of a student's life when testing for
pregnancy. In Vernonia the Court said, "it is significant that the tests at issue here
look only for drugs, and not for whether the student is, for example, epileptic,
pregnant, or diabetic. 217 This statement implies gathering information that discloses
whether a female is pregnant is more private, personal, and a greater intrusion than
209. See id. (suggesting by example that a mere "dental exam may reveal lazy tooth brushing habits and a
dermatological test may indicate too much time in the sun." Regardless, most "typical" examinations students are
subjected to do not possess negative stigma associated with a positive drug test.).
210. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 651 (showing the student who tests positive for drugs must choose between
a treatment program or a suspension from athletics for the remainder of the season and the next season).
211. See Ascolese, 902 F. Supp. at 550 (recognizing an employee may fear disclosing pregnancy to fellow
employees and may want to avoid a possible stigma or discrimination by an employer).
212. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
213. Samay, supra note 185, at 291.
214. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
215. Id. at 660.
216. Id. at 658.
217. Id. (implicitly stating that the level of intrusion of a drug test was less than that of a pregnancy or diabetic
test) (emphasis added).
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disclosing drug use as one has no legitimate privacy right to drug possession, and
concomitantly presence of drugs in one's system. The Court in Vernonia
distinguished drugs from pregnancy by noting the intrusion of drug testing was
lessened by the fact that the test did not reveal information regarding pregnancy.21
8
Therefore, based on the Court's most recent opinion on this matter, it seems logical
to conclude the Court would find testing a student athlete for pregnancy is a greater
intrusion than drug testing.
Further, the district court inAscolese, found pregnancy testing quite intrusive. 19
As stated above, in that case the employer required a pregnancy test as part of
female police officers' fitness test.220 The court found that the employee had a
substantial interest in maintaining the privacy of information regarding whether she
was pregnant. 221 Moreover, the Supreme Court has already established a strong
privacy interest in decisions regarding pregnancy.222 The Court in Griswold v.
Conneticut invalidated a state law that prohibited dispensing or the use of birth
control to or by married couples.223 The Court reasoned there was a right of privacy
regarding the use of birth control, among other decisions surrounding the "marriage
relationship," implicitly including pregnancy. 224 A female student athlete, just like
a female police officer, would have a substantial interest in keeping her pregnancy
status private.
The Ascolese court also said employees have many reasons not to take a
pregnancy test including keeping other employees from finding out the results, not
wanting to disclose a miscarriage or abortion, and avoiding potential discrimination
by employers.225 School students, including Gruenke, share similar reasons for not
wanting to take a pregnancy test. In fact, one of the concerns Gruenke had was
avoiding adverse consequences from her coach.226 Gruenke feared Seip would take
her off the team if he found out she was pregnant-reasoning similar to an
employee's concern about potential employment discrimination.227 Gruenke
consistently said it was "nobody's business" as to whether she was pregnant or
not.228 The court in Ascolese concluded the employee had sufficiently strong privacy
interests that were not significantly diminished by her work circumstances. 229 Thus,
218. Id. at 657.
219. 902 F. Supp. at 550
220. Id. at 553.
221. Id. at 550.
222. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
223. Id. at 485.
224. Id. at 486.
225. 902 F. Supp at 550.
226. 225 F.3d at 297.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 296.
229. See Ascolese, 902 F Supp. at 550 (holding that a person has a high privacy interest when tested for
pregnancy).
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a female student should have a strong privacy interest in information regarding
pregnancy.
Likewise, in Norman-Bloodsaw, an employer conducted a general employee
health examination and tested employees without their consent or knowledge, for
pregnancy, among other things.230 The court held pregnancy is "highly private and
sensitive medical information. '23' The court stated whether or not a woman is
pregnant is an aspect of her health that carries with it the highest expectation of
privacy.232 This analysis should apply with equal force to students.
The courts in Ascolese and Norman-Bloodsaw recognized adult employees'
substantial privacy interest in pregnancy testing.233 Furthermore, it appears the
courts in Ascolese and Norman-Bloodsaw gave the women's privacy interests and
expectation of privacy much more weight than the court in Gruenke did with respect
to student athletes.234 The Gruenke court's analysis was brief on this point and
perhaps, due to the lack of the school's legitimate interest, the court had already
determined that this was a clearly unreasonable search. It seems, however, a court
should and would give pregnancy testing significant weight just as these other courts
have.
There is a negative stigma surrounding drug users. Similarly, there is a negative
stigma surrounding pregnant teenagers. Both of these are very personal decisions,
and most students may want to keep them private. Finding out if a student uses
drugs often reveals poor personal judgments they have made. Testing female
students for pregnancy reveals their personal judgments regarding sexual
intercourse, which may be more intimate than revealing drug use.
Despite some similarities between drug use and pregnancy, there are many
differences causing the level of intrusion regarding pregnancy to be significantly
higher than drug use. "Pregnancy is likewise, for many, an intensely private matter,
which also may pertainto one's sexual history and often carries far-reaching societal
implications. 235 Courts have recognized the Constitution protects an individual's
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal sexual matters and in making certain
important decisions, such as using contraceptives. 236 In contrast, the use of illegal
drugs may be a matter society does not want to have a "privacy shield."
There is further support a student has a great expectation of privacy regarding
her pregnancy status. Society looks poorly on pregnant teenagers.237 Pregnant
230. See generally Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1264 (1997).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1270.
233. Ascolese, 902 F. Supp. at 550; Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d. at 1269-70.
234. Supra note 145 and accompanying text.
235. Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269.
236. Id.
237. See Teen Pregnancy-So What? (last visited July 15,2001), http://www.teenpregnancy.org/sowhat.htm.
(pointing out teen pregnancy costs society billions of dollars a year and hurts the business community's revenue
line).
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teenagers are a statistic many organizations want to decrease.238 Pregnant teenagers
may be seen as irresponsible, naive, and perhaps even burdensome to society.2 39 The
stigma is so great, many teenagers may choose an abortion in order to avoid the
harsh consequences of being a pregnant teenager.24° On average, pregnant teenagers
have approximately 405,000 abortions per year.24' When a student is forced to reveal
her pregnancy status, she loses the right to keep her personal information private.
Overall, pregnancy tests by their nature and the information they reveal are
much more invasive and intrusive than drug tests. Therefore, since the ramifications
of administering a pregnancy test significantly differ from a drug test, greater weight
should be lent to the student's expectation of privacy.
4. Manner of the Search
Another factor used to determine the level of intrusion is "the manner in which
the search was conducted. 242 In Vernonia, the student tested for drug use was able
to remain fully clothed and was only observed from behind by an adult of the same
sex. 243 The Court considered this situation similar to what occurs in a public
restroom. 2" Therefore, the Court concluded the privacy interest compromised, when
the school actually obtained the urine sample from the student, was negligible.245 To
a certain extent, the manner of drug testing is similar to one's experience in a typical
public restroom. However, people in public restrooms usually are not under the
pressure of someone standing behind them watching and waiting for them to urinate.
In contrast, Gruenke took the pregnancy test in a locker room, possibly in a
bathroom stall, while three other female team members waited in the locker room.246
There was no adult present nor anyone actually watching her. Gruenke's situation
is thus similar to what would occur in a female public restroom. Therefore, the
238. See A National Strategy to Prevent Teen Pregnancy: 1997-98 Annual Report (last visited July 15,2001),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/teenp/97-98rpt.htm. (stating the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services is going to
"develop a National Strategy to address this serious challenge and to assure that at least 25 percent of communities
in this country have teen pregnancy prevention programs in place").
239. See Removing the Mystery: Evaluation of a Parent Manual by Adolescent Parents (last visited July 15,
2001), http://www.findarticles.com/cfdls/m2248/n 129v33/20740158/p 1/article.jhtml (noting that teenagers lack
knowledge of child development and possess "inappropriate child-rearing attitudes." Furthermore, most teenage
parents drop out of school, are unemployed, and live in poverty.).
240. Teen Pregnancy: Statistics on Adolescent Pregnancy (last visited May 28,2001), http://www.teenshelter.
org/data.htm (providing annual statistics on teen pregnancies, births, and abortions).
241. Id.
242. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 296-97.
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manner of Gruenke's search was similar to that of the student in Vernonia.247 The
pregnancy test was obtained in a manner that is not considered too intrusive.248
5. Conclusion: Level of Intrusion
Students should not lose their constitutional protections when they go to
school.249 There is no persuasive reason to assert that student athletes have a lesser
expectation of privacy than other students. 250 Testing a student for pregnancy clearly
is a much greater intrusion than testing a student for drug use because of the nature
of the information revealed.251 Since forcing a student to take a pregnancy test is so
intrusive, a much stronger governmental interest should be required to justify the
reasonableness of this search, as compared to the governmental interest in
administering drug tests to students. 2
B. Governmental Interest in Pregnancy Status is Lower than Drug Use
In order for a search to be reasonable, the governmental interests must be greater
than the level of intrusion.253 The court will balance the level of intrusion upon an
individual against the governmental interests. 4 The governmental interest must be
"important enough to justify the particular search at hand. 2 5 The more intrusive the
search, the greater the government's interest must be to justify the search. 256 As
shown above,257 there is likely a higher level of intrusion in testing students for
pregnancy than in testing students for drugs. Therefore, the governmental interest
has to be greater than that offered in Vernonia to outweigh this intrusion.
247. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 296-97.
248. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
249. Supra Part V.A.1.
250. Supra Part IV.A.2.b.
251. Supra Part IV.A.3.b.
252. See discussion supra Part IV (arguing even more governmental interest is necessary than what the
Gruenke court recommended to justify an administration of a pregnancy test on a student).
253. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.
254. Id.
255. Id. (emphasis omitted).
256. Laurie L. Leverson, Grading School Searches How Far Do Fourth Amendment Protections Extend to
Students, 159 N.J. L.J. 29 (2000).
257. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658 (categorizing the drug test as less intrusive than the pregnancy test.
Therefore, by implication, there must be a higher level of intrusion in testing for pregnancy).
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1. Drug Testing
The government's interest in Vernonia was deterring students' use of drugs and
providing a safe, sound educational environment for all students.2 58 The Court
reasoned drug use is a major problem society wants to remedy. 25 9 Furthermore, the
school in Vernonia faced a verifiable drug crisis among its student population.260
Drug use has ill effects on the users, other students, and on the educational process
itself.
261
The Court placed great emphasis on the severe impact drugs have on students.262
The Vernonia Court first addressed the long term effects drug use had on teenagers:
School years are the time when physical, psychological, and addictive
effects of drugs are most severe. "Maturing nervous systems are more
critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are; childhood losses in
learning are lifelong and profound"; "children grow chemically dependent
more quickly than adults, and their record of recovery is depressingly
poor.
' 263
The Vernonia Court also considered the short term effects on drug using students.
264
Student athletes using drugs are at a high risk of immediate physical harm. 265 Drugs
create an altered state of the body which can increase heart rate and blood pressure
and thereby create a health risk to student athletes. 66
The school in Vernonia wanted to deter drug use among students.267 The
school's interest was student health and safety, and protecting the learning
environment. 268 Testing student athletes was a proper and narrowly tailored means
to achieve the school's interests.269 Athletes at that school were role models to other
students, but at the same time they were "leaders of a drug culture." 270 The school's
drug-testing policy protected student athletes and deterred drug use by all
258. Id. at 650.
259. Id.
260. Levenson, supra note 256; see also Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648-49 (describing teachers dealing with more
disciplinary problems as a result of increased drug use among students).
261. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 661 (citing Hawley, The Bumpy Road to Drug-Free Schools, 72 PHI DELTA KAPPAN, 310, 314
(1990)).
264. Id. at 662.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 649.
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students.271' The Vernonia Court found the governmental interests outweighed the
student's privacy interests.
272
2. Pregnancy Testing
a. Employees
In Ascolese, the court stated that due to the employee's strong privacy interest,
the employer must "demonstrate a compelling interest in conducting the pregnancy
test .. ,,273 The court found the employer's fitness program was "conducted with
a regulatory, preventative purpose" which is a common goal in "special needs"
cases.274 The employer asserted administering the pregnancy test is important to
protect the police officer's safety.27 If a female officer was pregnant, she should not
participate in the fitness program without first consulting with a doctor.276 Also, a
police officer must be physically fit in order to perform her job adequately because
it requires substantial physical exertion.277
b. Students
The preventative governmental interest given in Ascolese could likewise apply
to student athletes. Schools do not want students to be harmed or participate in any
rigorous physical activity without first consulting a doctor.278 Consequently, a
school's interest in testing female students for pregnancy could have a similar
preventive safety purpose. In Gruenke, the coach did in fact contact a doctor, after
he discovered Gruenke was pregnant, to ensure it was safe for her to participate in
relay races.279 Similar to a police officer, an athlete must be physically fit because
athletics require substantial physical exertion.
In Ascolese, the employer "came close" to demonstrating a compelling interest
in conducting a pregnancy test on an employee.280 Thus, if a school had this same
governmental interest, then when applied to students, a court could conclude it
outweighed the student's privacy interest.
Furthermore, assuming pregnancy among students is a problem at a school, the
school could assert a similar governmental interest as that of the school in Vernonia.
271. Id. at 649, 663.
272. Id. at 664-65.
273. 902 F. Supp. at 550.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 250-51.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 301 (suggesting "there may be unusual circumstances when a school nurse or
school official have legitimate concerns about a student's safety").
279. Id. at 297.
280. 902 F. Supp. at 550.
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In Vernonia, drug use was a problem;28' similarly, teenage pregnancy, although not
illegal, is a problem. 82 Teenage pregnancy is a recognized national problem similar
to drug use.283 The United States has the highest teen pregnancy rate of any
developed country;284 approximately one million teens become pregnant each
year.285 By age eighteen, one of four women will get pregnant.286 One of the top ten
disciplinary problems school teachers have is dealing with pregnant students.287 A
school could therefore assert it wants to deter students from getting pregnant.
Nearly 20 percent of pregnant teenagers will have a repeat pregnancy within a
year, and within two years, more than 31 percent will have a repeat pregnancy. 28s
Furthermore, there is a high cost to government associated with teenage
pregnancy-$25 to $50 billion per year.289 Overall, like drug use, teenage pregnancy
is a problem that society wants to deter.
A school could demonstrate the severe impact pregnancy has on students.
Pregnant students are faced with the decision of whether to terminate the pregnancy
or have the baby. This is a stressful decision students struggle with and one that
might interfere with their studies. Some pregnant students may not stay in school.
Pregnancy will likely deter or postpone a student's education and career preparation.
Therefore, a school could claim an interest in testing students for pregnancy.
3. Compare: Governmental Interest in Drug Testing Versus Governmental
Interest in Pregnancy Testing
When a school is testing a student for drugs or searching for a weapon, that
search aims to discover criminal activity--drug use, drug possession, or weapon
possession. However, when a school forces a student to take a pregnancy test there
is no potential criminal activity. Generally, engaging in sexual intercourse is not
illegal. Although sexual intercourse between a person over eighteen and a minor is
illegal in some states, a school that tests a student for pregnancy is not usually
seeking to discover a criminal activity such as statutory rape.
The court may require a school, invading a student's privacy by forcing her to
take a pregnancy test, to have a greater governmental interest than that present in the
281. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649.
282. See A National Strategy to Prevent Teen Pregnancy: 1997-98 Annual Report, supra note 238 (pointing
out although there has been a recent decline in teen birth rates, teen pregnancy is still a significant problem in the
United States).
283. Id.
284. Teen Pregnancy: Statistics on Adolescent Pregnancy (last visited May 28, 2001), http://www.teen
shelter.org/data.htm.
285. A National Strategy to Prevent Teen Pregnancy: 1997-98 Annual Report, supra note 238.
286. Teen Pregnancy: Statistics on Adolescent Pregnancy (last visited May 28, 2001), http://www.teen
shelter.org/data.htm.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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drug testing cases. Therefore, even if a school could assert that its governmental
interest was deterring pregnancy to protect students, this may not be a sufficient
interest.
Governmental interests, within the public school context, are persuasive when
the interest is to maintain a safe and productive school environment.290 The Vernonia
Court found drug use was very disruptive to the educational environment.2 9' Drug
users create a potential risk for other students and at the very least are distractions.292
In contrast, a pregnant student does not have this same effect upon the educational
environment. A pregnant student does not pose a risk to other students. A pregnant
student is not the same type of a distraction as a student on drugs. Overall, there is
less of a need to deter pregnancy in order to maintain a productive educational
environment than there is to deter drug use.
4. Critique of Gruenke
The dictum in Gruenke suggested that if a school official had a legitimate safety
concern about the student, then it could compel a student to take a pregnancy test.2 93
A pregnant student or the unborn child could be harmed if participating in a physical
activity.
Even if a school had a health concern about a pregnant student, that student may
argue she has the right to decide to participate in certain activities, including sports.
Allowing a school official to test her for pregnancy on the basis of a health or safety
concern takes away her right to decide whether to reveal her pregnant status.
Besides, a school could not forbid a student from participating in a sport or other
activity as a result of her pregnancy.
294
For example, according to Title IX of the Education Amendments,295 an
institution receiving federal funds may not discriminate against any student or
exclude any student from an educational program or activity, including any class or
extracurricular activity, on the basis of pregnancy. 296 The institution may require
such a student to obtain the certification of her physician that she is physically and
emotionally able to continue participation in the normal education program or
activity.297 Requiring a doctor's note is not as intrusive as compelling a student to
take a pregnancy test. If a school asserts its interest in testing students for pregnancy
is to prevent pregnant students from participating in sports or other activities for the
290. See generally Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646.
291. Seeid. at 662 (stating "[a]nd of course the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the
users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational process is disrupted").
292. Id.
293. 225 F.3d at 301.
294. 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 86 (1976); 45 C.ER § 86.40 (2000).
295. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681.
296. 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 86 (1976); 45 C.F.R § 86.40 (2000).
297. Id.
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student's safety, the school does not have the authority to exclude a student from
those activities unless her doctor agrees.
5. Conclusion: Governmental Interest
A school could show it has an interest in administering a pregnancy test to
students. One possible school interest is deterring teenage pregnancy.2 98 Another
possible school interest is preventing a pregnant student from physical harm by
participating in sports while pregnant.299 Overall, a school may be able to assert
several interests in compelling a student athlete to take a pregnancy test.
C. Conclusion: Balancing the Factors
Even if a school had the same level of governmental interest present in
Vernonia, specifically student health and safety and deterring pregnancy, this would
not be a sufficient governmental interest. There must be enough of a governmental
interest to justify the search at hand.300 Testing a student for pregnancy is a higher
level of intrusion than testing a student for drugs. 30 ' Therefore, the school would
need a greater governmental interest than that in Vernonia. In addition, the search
should be narrowly tailored to justify the intrusion. A school could better achieve
its ends by simply requiring student athletes to submit doctors' notes. Overall, a
school may have a difficult time justifying administering a pregnancy test to a
student athlete. A school may not be able to constitutionally compel a student to take
a pregnancy test if it only has a legitimate health and safety concern.
V. POLICY DISCUSSION
Over time, different standards have evolved concerning the constitutionality of
searches of public school students. However, the outer bounds of permissive school
searches remains unclear. The Court in TL.O. changed the requirements of what
constitutes a reasonable search in the school context. °2 Schools were not required
to meet the traditional probable cause or warrant mandate, but only needed
individualized suspicion in order to justify a search.3 °3 Then the Court in Vernonia
held the school did not even need individualized suspicion to have a reasonable
search, but that the testing could be purely random.3°4 If a school can search students
298. Supra notes 283-287 and accompanying text.
299. See Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 297 (implying the coach did eventually contact a doctor to see if it was safe
for Gruenke to continue swimming).
300. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.
301. See id. at 658 (suggesting pregnancy testing is more intrusive than drug testing).
302. 469 U.S.325.
303. Id. at 340.
304. 515 U.S. at 653.
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for drugs, then a school may be able to justify searches for other health matters,
assuming there are adequate governmental interests.
Testing students for drugs has created a slippery slope for different kinds of
testing, as evidenced by Gruenke. If testing a student for pregnancy is constitutional
when the governmental interest is high enough, then what about testing students for
HIV or AIDS? Of course testing one for HIV or AIDS is a very private and personal
matter, but so is pregnancy. Both health conditions carry negative societal
implications and both could reflect personal decisions a student has made regarding
sexual intercourse. Nevertheless, a school could argue that because athletes have
constant contact among each other, there is a great interest in compelling HIV or
AIDS testing for safety of other students. Furthermore, there is an even greater
interest in deterring the spread of disease and this may be accomplished if the
students were tested. The notion of allowing schools to compel students to take a
HIV or AIDS test in order to participate in sports may become a reality as a result
of the slippery slope created by the courts.
A school could potentially test students for diabetes or epilepsy because of a
safety concern of a student collapsing due to incorrect insulin levels or having a
seizure at an event. Yet, once again, the student's privacy interest is compromised
and the student may be forced to reveal personal medical information if the school
has a sufficient interest. How far can schools go in testing students or searching
students on the whim of a safety concern?
The courts havejustified school programs, such as random drug testing, because
of "the need to raise student protections, but ironically, [these school programs]
serve to lower students' expectations of privacy as well as their constitutional
protections of that interests., 30 5 There needs to be greater protection for student
privacy, as information regarding one's health status is very personal. However, the
courts may find these types of searches are constitutional if the factors are balanced
according to the test designed in Vernonia. The balancing test designed in Vernonia
may not give students the amount of protection they need and to which they are
constitutionally entitled. In reality, courts have seriously diminished students'
constitutional protections and one can only wonder how schools may now take
advantage of this leeway and invade students' constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
VI. CONCLUSION
Overall, the court has established factors that afford students less constitutional
protection.306 Testing a student for drugs has been found constitutional. Therefore,
it may only be a matter of time until a court allows schools to invade students' rights
305. Bill 0. Heder, Note, The Development of Search and Seizure Law in Public Schools, 1999 BYU EDUC.
&L.J. 71, 114 (1999).
306. Supra Part IV.
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further and test for pregnancy pursuant to a "legitimate" governmental interest." 7
However, even under the Vernonia standard, a pregnancy test is more intrusive than
a drug test.308 Students should not have reduced expectations of privacy just because
they are students. °9 Furthermore, there is not much supporting the court's
distinction between students and student athletes." ° Courts have found that an adult
has a significant privacy interest in her pregnancy status and forcing her to reveal
that status is very intrusive. 31 Likewise, a court should find that a student has a great
privacy interest in whether or not she is pregnant.312
One can only hope that the courts remember that the Fourth Amendment was
created to protect all citizens from unreasonable searches. Students need to be
protected from schools administering unreasonable searches. Based upon prior court
rulings it seems fair to say students are in fact losing their constitutional protections
at the schoolhouse gate.
Supra Part V.
Supra Part IV.A.3.b.
Supra Part IVA. 1.
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